Young Hong Kongers oppose unification with China

NEARLY a year and a half after Hong Kong’s “umbrella revolution” (Sept.-Dec. 2014), the legacy of the seemingly unsuccessful protest continues to dominate Hong Kong’s political debate. This adds a new twist to already complicated relations with Beijing, writes World Review Guest Expert Joseph Dobbs. Hong Kong’s economic leaders are concerned that the growing question mark over the city’s political future imperils its economic prospects. With the young generation turning increasingly rebellious, with legislative elections set for later this year and with the controversial election of the city’s chief executive set for 2017, political debate in Hong Kong is virtually certain to remain tense. Any strong response from Beijing could darken the former British colony’s future still further. During the last two months of 2015, five Hong Kong booksellers were reported missing. They surfaced in China facing what are widely believed to be spurious criminal charges (two of the five have since returned to Hong Kong, but they refuse to comment on the situation). Activists and human rights groups in Hong Kong are convinced that it was a set of gossipy books on the personal lives of Chinese Communist Party officials that prompted Beijing to abduct the five. The case of the missing booksellers is a glaring example of Beijing’s undermining of the autonomy it guaranteed Hong Kong at the handover in 1997. And this is just the latest iteration of what many Hong Kongers see as an erosion of Hong Kong’s rule of law, and the principle of “one country, two systems” itself. Small wonder that the international financial community is beginning to have concerns about Hong Kong’s independence. The recent decision by HSBC not to return its global headquarters to the city, while largely an endorsement of London, was reported by Reuters to be partly based on the banking group’s concerns about Hong Kong. The Heritage Foundation’s 2016 Index of Economic Freedom ranks Hong Kong the highest in the world, but it noted that “ongoing efforts to erode the power of Hong Kong’s judiciary and Legislative Council and to intervene in the economy could undermine the rule of law.” China’s leaders can’t fail to notice that only 31.1 percent of Hong Kong residents identify as primarily Chinese, with 67.6 percent identifying first and foremost as Hong Kongers. The biggest concern to Beijing is the increasing disassociation with China among Hong Kong’s youth. As much as 82.6 percent of 18-29 year olds identify as Hong Kongers, with only 13.3 percent identifying primarily as Chinese. In Hong Kong’s postcolonial life, this age group has always been “less Chinese” than its elders, but Chinese identity among the young has been at a record low for the last several years, and the identity gap between the young and the old is wider than it has ever been. The increasingly politically active youth seeks to harness Hong Kong’s latent localism now, long demonstrated in anti-mainlander sentiments, and form a political movement to carry on the legacy of the umbrella revolution. The divide between Hong Kong and the mainland looks therefore set only to widen in the coming decades. The tendency may seem crucial in the context of the city-state being obligated to reunify completely with the rest of China in 2047. Today, most Hong Kongers either do not want independence from China or realize that it is next to impossible. But if the young “umbrella soldiers’s” line of thinking makes its way into the mainstream political debate in Hong Kong, it is certain to elicit a strong response from Beijing. Hong Kong’s status after 2047 may seem like a distant issue, but the city’s near-term financial stability will rely on the issue being settled well in advance, so it can avoid a flight of capital in the 2030s. For a more in-depth look at this subject with scenarios looking to future outcomes, go to our sister site: Geopolitical Information Service. Sign in for 3 Free Reports or Subscribe.

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